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A COMPOSITIONAL APPROACH TO ASYNCHRONOUS DESIGN
VERIFICATION WITH AUTOMATED STATE SPACE REDUCTION
Jared Ahrens
ABSTRACT
Model checking is the most effective means of verifying the correctness of asynchronous
designs, and state space exploration is central to model checking. Although model checking
can achieve very high verification coverage, the high degree of concurrency in asynchronous
designs often leads to state explosion during state space exploration. To inhibit this explosion, our approach builds on the ideas of compositional verification. In our approach, a
design modeled in a high level description is partitioned into a set of parallel components.
Before state space exploration, each component is paired with an over-approximated environment to decouple it from the rest of the design. Then, a global state transition graph is
constructed by reducing and incrementally composing component state transition graphs.
We take great care during reduction and composition to preserve all failures found during
the initial state space exploration of each component. To further reduce complexity, interface constraints are automatically derived for the over-approximated environment of each
component. We prove that our approach is conservative in that false positive results are
never produced. The effectiveness of our approach is demonstrated by the experimental
results of several case studies showing that our approach can verify designs that cannot be
handled by traditional flat approaches. The experiments also show that constraints can
reduce the size of the global state transition graph and prevent some false failures.

v

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

In an asynchronous circuit, there is no global control signal to synchronize the operations
of different portions of the circuit. Without global synchronization, different orderings
of signal transitions in a circuit may result in different circuit behavior. Therefore, all
possible orderings among signal transitions need to be checked to assure correctness. When
a circuit displays a high degree of concurrency, the number of all possible orderings of
signal transitions can be excessively large, in which case the traditional simulation-based
verification approach becomes inadequate. A better approach is model checking which is
an exhaustive method of verification that guarantees that a property holds for the all states
of a design. Traditional flat model checking attempts to produce a single state transition
graph representing the complete design, but this approach quickly fails when applied to
both large and small designs containing a high degree of concurrent activities. The high
degree of concurrency requires an exponential number of states to represent the design.
This is known as state space explosion.
To overcome this problem, we develop a framework wherein a reduced global state
transition graph is built from the bottom to the top in the design hierarchy. An asynchronous circuit design is modeled as a set of parallel components running concurrently;
we express this model as a boolean guarded Petri-net. First, a state transition graph is
found for each component. To decouple the component from the rest of design, we use an
over-approximated environment to simulate the rest of the design communicating with the
component under consideration. The over-approximated environment reproduces all input
behavior that the complete design would supply to the component. It is possible that some
failures will be found during local state space exploration, and an approach is formalized
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to preserve the failures found during this step. Next, the state transition graphs for the
components are composed to form the global state transition graph for the complete design. During composition, behavior not observable on the interface of the complete design
is abstracted away to contain the size of the intermediate results. The result is a reduced
representation of the complete design.
The over-approximated environment may produce extra input behavior which can cause
a component to exude extra output behavior. When the component is embedded in the
complete design, this extra behavior is not produced. This extra behavior can create extra
states and false failures in the state transition graphs. One alternative is a user generated
environment. User generated environments may be highly accurate, but they are very difficult to derive. For large designs, they become nearly impossible. To reduce the occurrence
of these extra states and false failures, we complement our framework with the automated
generation of constraints. During composition, we decouple a component from the rest of
the design and add an over-approximated environment to drive its inputs. If the component
were embedded in the complete design, another component would drive its inputs. To refine
the over-approximation for a particular input, we examine the state transition graph of the
component which would drive the input. Then we generate a boolean expression from the
state transition graph. The boolean expression, which we refer to as a constraint, describes
when an input may occur and is used to restrain the behavior of the over-approximated environment. This results in a more accurate over-approximated environment which produces
fewer extra states and false failures.
1.1

Related Work

Compositional reasoning and abstraction are essential to verifying large systems. Compositional reasoning, broadly referring to compositional verification or compositional minimization, takes advantage of the given design hierarchy. A general compositional verification
method is based on assume-guarantee style reasoning, and verifies global properties by verifying local properties of each component in a system [3, 4, 5, 6, 7]. In a compositional
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verification framework, each component of a system is considered separately. During verification, assumptions are made about the environment with which the component interacts;
then these assumptions need to be discharged later. Assumptions are typically generated
by the user. If the component has complex interactions with its environment, it can be difficult to make accurate assumptions. Recent works have attempted to derive assumptions
automatically. In [8], an automated approach is described to generate the assumptions for
compositional verification. This approach starts with a set of the weakest assumptions for
a component, and iteratively refines these assumptions. Although the approach guarantees
that the iteration terminates, it is not clear how efficient the approach would be in terms
of iterations necessary to generate a set of assumptions to prove the properties. Also, this
approach can only handle safety properties. In addition, global specification needs to be broken down to local properties defined on the interfaces of the components, which can be very
difficult. [24, 25, 26, 27] also propose methods to automate the generation of assumptions,
but these methods are costly because they must first generate false counter-examples.
Abstraction produces the reduced model of a system by abstracting away certain details
that are unnecessary when reasoning about the system [14, 15]. Abstraction methods based
on Petri-net reduction are described in [1, 2]. These methods simplify Petri-net models of
asynchronous circuits either by following the design partitions or as directed by the properties to be verified. The reductions described in these methods attempt to reduce the model
before state space exploration. Although these methods are very effective, they are limited
to a particular kind of Petri-net. In [9], a compositional minimization method is described
where the global minimized state transition system is built by iteratively minimizing and
composing the components in finite state system. To contain the size of the intermediate
results, user-provided context constraints are required. This may be a problem in that the
state space may be large in the first place. The requirement of user-provided context constraints may also be a problem in that the constraints may be over restrictive, thus causing
false positive verification results. Similar work is also described in [10, 11, 12, 13]. In [16], a
hierarchical approach similar to that in [17] is presented. In this approach, an abstraction
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for each module in a system is found and verification is applied to the composition of those
abstractions. In [18], a constraint oriented proof methodology is applied to verify infinite
systems. Constraints on infinite systems are broken into an infinite number of simple constraints on finite systems, then these constraints are grouped into finite equivalent classes.
However, this methodology is not complete in that the reduction of infinite systems is not
guaranteed. In [19], a software model checking method utilizing lazy abstraction is presented to improve performance by adding information during abstraction refinement only
when necessary. It would be interesting to see if this method can be adapted to hardware
verification.
1.2

Contributions
This thesis makes two contributions: a new automated compositional verification flow

and automated generation of constraints to create a more accurate over-approximated environment for the composition flow.
The first contribution is a new automated verification flow. Previous works require
either user provided assumptions or iterative counter example refinement. User provided
assumptions are dangerous in that they may be over restrictive and prevent valid behavior
from appearing in the model. This could result in false positive verification results. Automated approaches based on counter-example refinement hold some promise but can take
longer than the flat approach. Our methodology combines several existing methodologies to
reduce and verify large pre-partitioned designs without user intervention. In a later chapter
we prove that our method produces no false positives results for a design.
The second and most significant contribution is the automated refinement of the overapproximated environment. During our design flow, we apply an over-approximated environment to each component. The over-approximated environment often supplies additional
input to a component. The component can respond to this additional input with additional
output. This additional input and output exacerbates state space explosion and increases
the resource required to verify the design. The other side-effect of the over-approximated
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environment is the production of false failures. To restrain the over-approximated environment, we derive constraints from the state transition graphs of other components. Our constraints can be generated automatically to increase the accuracy of our over-approximated
environment. The increased accuracy of the environment contains the size of state space
explosion and prevents the creation of many false failures.
1.3

Thesis Overview
This thesis is organized such that each chapter builds on the ideas of the previous chap-

ters. Chapter 2 describes Boolean Guarded Petri-nets and State Transition Graphs, the
formalisms we use to represent an asynchronous design. The chapter also describes the relationships we may derive between state transition graphs based on paths and traces. Chapter
3 lays the framework of our automated methodology. The framework includes methods of
state space reduction and automatic generation of over-approximated environments. Chapter 4 presents a method of refining the over-approximated environment which Chapter 3
describes. Chapter 5 describes the experimental results using the methods presented in
this thesis. Three approaches are compared in this chapter: flat verification of the complete design, automated compositional verification using an unrefined over-approximated
environment, and automated compositional verification using a refined over-approximated
environment.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND

This chapter presents an overview of Petri-nets which are used to model asynchronous
circuits, state transition graphs for verification, and related concepts upon which the later
chapters are based.
2.1

Boolean Guarded Petri-nets
Petri-nets are a common modeling formalism for asynchronous designs. There are many

different forms of Petri-nets for different applications. This section presents a form of Petrinets which addresses certain modeling difficulties for asynchronous designs with traditional
Petri-nets.
2.1.1

Structural Definitions

A boolean guarded Petri-net (BGPN) is a bipartite directed graph consisting of transitions
and places. Its definition is given as follows.
Definition 2.1.1. A Boolean Guarded Petri-net N is a tuple (W, T, P, F, µ 0 , L, B) where
1. W is the set of wires of the asynchronous design being modeled,
2. T is the set of transitions,
3. P is the set of places,
4. F is the flow relation,
5. µ0 is the initial marking,
6. L is the action labeling function,
7. B is the boolean labeling function.
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A visual representation of a BGPN is shown in Figure 2.2. In a BGPN, the transitions in
T are represented as the thick bars, and the places in P are represented as the circles. Each
transition is preceded and followed by one or more places in P , and each place is preceded
and followed by one or more transitions in T . The connections between transitions and
places are defined with the flow relations.
Definition 2.1.2. The flow relation of a BGPN N is F ⊆ (T × P ) ∪ (P × T ).
For each transition, its preset is the set of places that are connected to the transition,
and its postset is the set of places to which the transition is connected. The preset and
postset of a place are defined similarly. The preset and postset of both a transition and a
place are defined as follows.
Definition 2.1.3. For a transition t in a BGPN N , its preset is •t = {p ∈ P | (p, t) ∈ F },
and its postset is t• = {p ∈ P | (t, p) ∈ F }. For a place p in a BGPN N , its preset is
•p = {t ∈ T | (t, p) ∈ F }, and its postset is p• = {t ∈ T | (p, t) ∈ F }.
The dots found in some places are tokens. Each place may contain one or more tokens.
If a place has a token, it is marked. A set of marked places is a marking of a BGPN. The
marking is defined as follows.
Definition 2.1.4. The marking of a BGPN N is µ = {p ∈ P | p is marked}.
As will be seen later, a marking represents a state of a BGPN and the asynchronous
design being modeled. In our method, we use 1-safe BGPNs such that a place can only
have at most one token in every µ. µ0 is the initial marking of a BGPN.
W is a finite set of wires in an asynchronous circuit design. The set W consists of input
and output wires which we denote I and O. Each wire w ∈ W can take one of two actions
at any time. w+ indicates that the value of w changes from 0 to 1, and w− indicates that
the value of w changes from 1 to 0. A rising transition on the wire ack is expressed ack+.
Similarly, ack− expresses a falling transition on the wire ack. The action labeling function
L maps a BGPN transition to an action on a wire, thereby associating BGPN transitions
to the dynamic behavior in an asynchronous design. Transitions not associated with any
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action are called dummy transitions. For completeness we map dummy transitions to the
nil action $. Dummy transitions do not represent any behavior in the modeled design. They
are a modeling construct generated when compiling a design into a BGPN model to hold
certain conditions in the design. The labeling function is defined as follows.
Definition 2.1.5. The transition labeling function L of a BGPN N assigns each transition
n

o

with an action on a wire or a dummy action, L : T → W × {+, −} ∪ {$}.
For each transition t, the flow relations from the places in •t to t are labeled with boolean
formulas. This makes modeling of asynchronous designs less awkward in situations where
the transitions depend not only on other transitions, but also on the values of some wires
in a design. The boolean labeling function is defined as follows.
Definition 2.1.6. The boolean labeling function of a BGPN N is B : (P × T ) ⊆ F → b
where b is a boolean formula defined over W .
Let b(p, t) return the boolean formula labeled for (p, t). Given a transition t, the tuple
(p, b, t) denotes an enabling rule of t where p ∈ •t and B(p, t) = b. Given a transition t,
enabling rules(t) denotes the set of all enabling rules of t. The enabling rules define the
condition when a transition can fire, as will be explained later.
If the boolean labeling function of a BGPN N maps each rule to boolean formula
true, then the BGPN is converted to a traditional Petri-net. In general, the analysis
complexity for BGPNs is higher than that for the traditional Petri-nets. BGPN behavior is
defined by both the marking and boolean expressions. However, the structural complexity
of BGPNs can be much less than that of the traditional Petri-nets, thus resulting in a
large decrease in the analysis complexity for BGPNs. The above point is illustrated by
example in Figures 2.1 and 2.2. They show the BGPN and the traditional Petri-net model
for an AND-gate described in [20]. Both models are driven by a maximal environment. The
traditional Petri-net model requires ten places and seventeen transitions, and its transitions
are not required to satisfy any boolean expressions. The BGPN representation only requires
six places and six transitions, but it also includes two boolean expressions.
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2.1.2

Semantics

This section presents the firing semantics of transitions. Since the BGPN transitions in
an asynchronous design model are associated with actions on wires, firing the transitions
reflects the execution of the associated actions, thus changing the states of the design.
Executing an action is known as an event. Without incidents of confusion, events and
transition firings are used interchangeably in the following.
The state of a BGPN is the pair (µ, α) where µ is a marking of the BGPN and α is
the vector representing the boolean values of the wires in W of the modeled design in µ.
Given a state s, the function µ(s) accesses the µ component of s. Similarly, the function
α(s) accesses the α component of s. A transition needs to be enabled before it can fire at
a state. For a transition to be enabled, all of its enabling rules must be satisfied. Given a
transition t, an enabling rule r of t is satisfied at a state if the place of r is marked and the
boolean formula of r is satisfied at the current state. Given a state s = (µ, α), let eval(s, b)
be a function that returns true if b evaluates to true with α, false otherwise.
Definition 2.1.7. A rule (p, b, t) of t is satisfied at a state s = (µ, α) if p ∈ µ and eval(s, b) =
true.
A set of satisfied enabling rules of a transition t at a state s is denoted as satisfied(t, s).
A transition is enabled if all its enabling rules are satisfied.
Definition 2.1.8. A transition t is enabled at a state s if

enabling rules(t) = satisfied(t, s).
The set of transitions that are enabled at a state s is denoted as enabled(s).
Given a set of enabled transitions at a state, we exhaustively fire transitions from the
enabled transition set. The firing of a transition changes the marking and causes the action
associated with the transition to occur. After firing a transition t, the preset of the transition
is removed from the current marking, and the postset is added to the marking. This step
is known as the marking update. Given a marking µ, firing t results in a new marking
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µ0 = (µ − •t) + t•. Our method requires that the BGPNs are 1-safe such that each place
can contain no more than one token at any state. The value of the wire in the state vector
is also updated accordingly, depending on the associated action of that transition after a
transition firing. Let s = (µ, α) be a state, and a transition t fired at s. Also, let a be the
associated action of t. The state vector α is updated as follows after firing t:




α(w)




∀w ∈ W. α(w) =

1





 0

if a is a dummy action
if a = w+
if a = w−

Updating the marking and state vector of the model constitutes a change in the system’s
state. Later we will see these events represented as state transitions in a state transition
graph.
2.1.3

BGPN Composition

Usually, an asynchronous design consists of a number of components running in parallel.
Each component is modeled in a BGPN, and the model for the entire design is the parallel
composition of the component BGPNs. This section presents the definition of the parallel
composition of BGPNs.
Let N1 = W1 , T1 , P1 , F1 , µ01 , L1 , B1 and N2 = W2 , T2 , P2 , F2 , µ02 , L2 , B2 be two BG



PNs where W1 = I1 ∪ O1 , and W2 = I2 ∪ O2 . The parallel composition of N1 and N2 ,
referred to as N1 kN2 , is defined as follows:
Definition 2.1.9. Given two BGPNs N1 and N2 , if O1 ∩ O2 = ∅, the parallel composition of
N1 and N2 , N = W, T, P, F, µ0 , L, B , is defined as follows:


1. W = W1 ∪ W2 ,
2. T = T1 ∪ T2 ,
3. P = P1 ∪ P2 ,
4. F = F1 ∪ F2 ,
5. µ0 = (µ01 , µ02 ),
11

6. L = L1 ∪ L2
7. B = B1 ∪ B2
2.2

State Transition Graphs

In the previous section, firing a BGPN transition at a state results in a new state by
updating the marking and state vector. By exhaustively firing all enabled transitions at
each state, a state transition graph containing all reachable states in a design can be found.
This step is often referred to as state space exploration. A state transition graph (STG) is
a graph wherein the nodes are states and the arcs are state transitions which are labeled
with the BGPN transition firings that cause the state transition. For illustrative purposes
we often label the arcs of a state transition graph with the BGPN transition’s associated
action.
Definition 2.2.1. A state transition graph G is the tuple (N, S ∪ {π}, R, s 0 ) where:
1. N is the BGPN from which the STG is derived,
2. S is the set of reachable states,
3. π is the failure state,








4. R is the set of state transitions S × T × (S ∪ {π}) ∪ {π} × T × {π} ,
5. s0 ∈ S is the initial state of the STG.
A state transition is the tuple (s, t, s 0 ), (s, t, π), or (π, τ, π). The state transition (s, t, s 0 )
indicates that a particular BGPN transition t is fired from state s and changes the state
of the system to s0 . For the simplicity of presentation, we also use R as a function. Given
t

a state transition (s, t, s0 ), (s, t, s0 ) ∈ R iff R(s, t, s0 ) holds. Sometimes we also use s → s0
instead of (s, t, s0 ) to indicate a state transition. π is a special state which denotes a failure
in the modeled design. This state is used to represent unintended behavior or behavior we
wish to prevent. Once the system enters this special state, the behavior produced afterwards
is irrelevant, and the system is regarded to remain at this state forever in our method. Let
τ represent an arbitrary transition on any wire which is fired from the failure state. Once
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a system enters the failure state, all future BGPN transitions firings are represented in the
STG using the notation (π, τ, π).
t

t

0
1
A path ρ in a STG G is an infinite sequence of state transitions ρ = (s 0 →
s1 →
s2 · · ·)

t

0
such that s0 = s0 and R(sn , tn , sn+1 ) holds for n = 0, 1, · · ·. Given the paths ρ 1 = (s0 →

t

t

τ

τ

t

t

t

t

t

t

t

1
2
3
0
1
4
5
0
1
s1 →
π→
π→
π · · ·) and ρ2 = (s0 →
s1 →
π→
π→
π · · ·), the notation ρ12 = (s0 →
s1 →

π → π → π · · ·) describes a set of failure paths including ρ 1 and ρ2 .
A trace is an infinite sequence of BGPN transition firings. A trace σ = (t 0 , t1 , · · ·) of a
t

t

0
1
STG is valid if a path (s0 →
s1 →
s2 · · ·) exists. For traces containing the failure state, we

use the notation σ = (t0 , t1 , t2 , · · · , tn , τ ∗ ). The symbol τ ∗ indicates an infinite sequence of
firings of arbitrary BGPN transitions after reaching the failure state π.
Given a BGPN N , the function G(N ) returns the STG G by performing state space
exploration on N . According to the firing semantics described in Section 2.1.2, each BGPN
has an unique STG. Therefore, we also use P(N ) to denote all valid traces of the BGPN N .
P(N ) can be derived from the corresponding STG of N by state space exploration from the
initial state. Figure 2.3 shows the state space exploration algorithm that is used to produce
a STG from a BGPN.
The projection function, σ[W 0 ] where W 0 ⊆ W , removes all events from a trace σ =
(t0 , t1 , t2 , . . .) whose underlying wires are not in W 0 . More formally, if σ 6=  (i.e., the empty
trace) and given the subtrace x where x ⊆ σ, then

0

σ[W ] =



 (t0 , x[W 0 ])

 (x[W 0 ])

if ∃w ∈ W 0 . t0 = w × {+, −}
otherwise

If σ = , then σ[W 0 ] = {}. This function is extended naturally to a set of traces. Given
a STG G, we use G[W 0 ] to denote the projection of G to W 0 by applying σ[W 0 ] to all
traces in G. For convenience we will use W (N ) to denote the set of wires used to label
the transitions of the BGPN N and W (G) to denote the set of wires where G is defined.
Similarly, W (σ) denotes the set of wires where the BGPN transitions of σ are defined. The
notations I(N ) and O(N ) are functions returning the input or output wires of a design
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represented in BGPN. Similarly, I(G) and O(G) return the input and output wires of a
design represented as an STG. For a BGPN transition t, w(t) returns the signal where t
is defined. The projection function can also be extended to boolean expressions through
existential quantification. The projection of a boolean formula b[W 0 ] produces a boolean
formula over the wires W 0 .
Similar to BGPN composition, if a design consists of a set of parallel components, each of
which is modeled as an STG, the global STG for the entire design is the parallel composition
of the individual ones. The parallel composition of STGs is defined as follows.
Definition 2.2.2. Let G1 = (N1 , S1 , R1 , s01 ) and G2 = (N2 , S2 , R2 , s02 ) be two STGs where
W (N1 ) = I1 ∪ O1 , and W (N1 ) = I2 ∪ O2 . If O1 ∩ O2 = ∅, the parallel composition
G = G1 kG2 defines G = (N, S, R, s0 ) as follows:
1. N = N1 kN2
2. S ⊆ S1 × S2
3. s0 = (s01 , s02 )
4. R = r1 ∪ r2 ∪ r3 ∪ r4 ∪ r5 ∪ r6 ∪ r7 ∪ r8 where for every s1 ∈ S1 and s2 ∈ S2 ,
a. If w(t) ∈ W (N1 ) and w(t) ∈
/ W (N2 )
• r1 = {((s1 , s2 ), t, (s01 , s2 ) | (s1 , t, s01 ) ∈ R1 }
• r2 = {((s1 , s2 ), t, π) | (s1 , t, π) ∈ R1 }
b. If w(t) ∈
/ W (N1 ) and w(t) ∈ W (N2 )
• r3 = {((s1 , s2 ), t, (s1 , s02 )) | (s2 , t, s02 ) ∈ R2 }
• r4 = {((s1 , s2 ), t, π) | (s2 , t, π) ∈ R2 }
c. If w(t) ∈ W (N1 ) and w(t) ∈ W (N2 )
• r5 = {((s1 , s2 ), t, (s01 , s02 )) | (s1 , t, s01 ) ∈ R1 and (s2 , t, s02 ) ∈ R2 }
• r6 = {((s1 , s2 ), t, π) | (s1 , t, π) ∈ R1 and (s2 , t, s02 ) ∈ R2 }
• r7 = {((s1 , s2 ), t, π) | (s1 , t, s01 ) ∈ R1 and (s2 , t, π) ∈ R2 }
• r8 = {((s1 , s2 ), t, π) | (s1 , t, π) ∈ R1 and (s2 , t, π) ∈ R2 }
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find sg((W, T, P, F, µ0 , L, B), s0 )
Te = enabled(s0)
push(s0 , Te )
failure = false
while stack is not empty do
(s, Te ) = pop()
s0 = s
t = select(Te )
if Te − t 6= ∅ then
push(s, Te − {t})
if (µ(s) − •t) ∩ t• 6= ∅ then
failure = true
µ(s0 ) = (µ(s) − •t) ∪ t•
if L(t) = w+ then
if α(s)[w] = 1 then
failure = true
α(s0 )[w] = 1
else if L(t) = w− then
if α(s)[w] = 0 then
failure = true
α(s0 )[w] = 0
Te0 = enabled(s0)
if Te0 = ∅ and stack is empty then
failure = true
else if (Te − {t}) 6⊂ Te0 then
failure = true
if failure = true then
R = R ∪ {(s, t, π)}
else
if s0 6∈ S then
S = S ∪ {s0 }
if Te0 6= ∅ then
push(s0 , Te0 )
R = R ∪ {(s, t, s0 )}
return (S, R)

// check safety failure

// check complement failure

// check complement failure

// check deadlock failure
// check disabling failure

Figure 2.3 Algorithm to find the reachable state space with failure preservation
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N of the composite STG is the BGPN composition of N 1 and N2 . S of G is a subset of
all possible pairs of states from S1 and S2 . S consists of those states in S1 × S2 which are
reachable from s0 . Whether a state in S1 × S2 is reachable depends upon the set of state
transitions R which is explained below.
Suppose a design consists of two components running in parallel. The synchronization
between them is through wires from the outputs of one component to the inputs of another.
In this case, both components make a state transition in parallel by changing the values
of the common wires between them. Otherwise, if one component makes a transition not
visible to another one, the state transition of the entire design follows the component that
makes the transition while the state of the other component is regarded to remain the
same. In other words, if a component makes an internal state transition, it is reflected in
the entire design while the other component is viewed as not changing. All the following
cases are considered in the composition definition for R. The first case defines how a
global state transition is produced from a state transition visible only to G 1 . In addition,
when G1 makes a transition to the failure state, the entire design makes a transition to the
failure state regardless of the current state of G 2 . The second case is symmetric to case 1
defining how a global state transition is produced from a state transitions only visible to
G2 . Similarly, when G2 makes a transition to the failure state, the entire design makes a
transition to the failure state no matter what state of G 1 is. The third case defines global
state transitions when both G1 and G2 make synchronized transitions. If either one of G 1 or
G2 transitions to the failure state, the entire design transitions to the failure state. It has
been proved in [11] that the parallel composition of STGs is commutative and associative.
The STG composition algorithm is shown in Figure 2.4.
2.3

Correctness Definitions of Asynchronous Designs

In Section 2.2, a special failure state π is used to denote that the design makes a wrong or
unexpected state transition. In this section, we define the conditions under which transition
firings cause asynchronous design failure.
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In our method, a design is considered correct if none of the following failures are present
in a model. There are four types of failures considered in our method: safety failures,
complement failures, disabling failures, and deadlocks. These failures are defined as follows.
t

t

0
1
Definition 2.3.1. Let ρ = (s0 →
s1 →
s2 · · ·) be a path in a STG G where R(si , ti , si+1 ) for

all i ≥ 0. Firing ti causes
1. A safety failure if (µ(si ) − •ti ) ∩ ti • 6= ∅.
2. A complement failure if
a. ti = w + ∧α(si )[w] = 1, or
b. ti = w − ∧α(si )[w] = 0.
3. A disabling failure if (enabled(s i ) − {ti }) 6⊆ enabled(si+1 ).
4. A deadlock if enabled(si+1 ) = ∅.
Intuitively, a valid trace causes a safety failure if after firing a transition, the marking
update adds a token to a place that already exists in the marking. The 1-safe requirement of
Petri-nets is common for state space exploration algorithms. An unsafe net (i.e., one that is
not 1-safe) typically indicates a problem with the underlying design. A valid trace causes a
complement failure on wire w if there exist two rising (falling) events on w without a falling
(rising) event in-between. Complement failures are a common modeling error and usually
occur when the set and reset phase of a signal are similar. A disabling failure happens if
the boolean guard of a satisfied rule becomes disabled before the corresponding enabled
transition is fired. It may indicate a violation of hold time requirement of the underlying
design. A valid trace causes a deadlock if a state is reached where there is no transition
enabled. Given a BGPN N , the set of failure traces of N is F(N ) ⊆ P(N ). Given two
BGPNs N1 and N2 , the following property holds:

F(N1 ) ⊆ F(N2 ) if P(N1 ) ⊆ P(N2 )

A design N is said correct or failure-free if F(N ) = ∅.
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(2.1)

2.4

Conformance Relation

In this section, we describe conformance relation between models of a design and its
implication to verification. The purpose of conformance relation is to find a model of
smaller size for a design while preserving enough information for sound verification.
First, the definition of conformance is given as follows:
Definition 2.4.1. Given two BGPNs N1 and N2 where W1 = I1 ∪ O1 and W2 = I2 ∪ O2 , N1
conforms to N2 , denoted as N1  N2 , if I1 = I2 , O1 = O2 , and P(N1 kN ) ⊆ P(N2 kN ) for
all N .
Theorem 2.4.1. Given BGPNs N1  N2 and N2  N3 , then N1  N3 .
Proof: According to Definition 2.4.1, N 1  N2 implies P(N1 ) ⊆ P(N2 ), and N2  N3
implies P(N2 ) ⊆ P(N3 ). From P(N1 ) ⊆ P(N2 ) ⊆ P(N3 ) we may conclude P(N1 ) ⊆ P(N3 )
making conformance transitive.

From the definition, we see that conformance is defined over the same set of input and
output wires. This is sensible because conformance is often applied to models of a design
at the different abstraction levels. According to Equation 2.1, if a concrete model conforms
to an abstract one, then failures displayed by the concrete model are also displayed by
the abstract one. In other words, any failures caught when verifying the abstract model
includes those in the concrete one. If no failures are found in the abstract model, we can
conclude the unverified concrete model also contains no failures. Therefore, the verification
complexity can be greatly reduced by finding an abstract model if abstract model is smaller
than the concrete model and the concrete model conforms to the abstract model.
The following lemmas show that conformance is preserved for parallel composition. The
proof for Lemma 2.4.1 can be found in [21]
Lemma 2.4.1. Given BGPNs N1 , N2 , and N3 , N1 kN3  N2 kN3 if N1  N2 .
Lemma 2.4.2. Given BGPNs N1 , N2 , N3 , and N4 , N1 kN2  N3 kN4 if N1  N3 and
N2  N 4 .
18

Proof: According to Lemma 2.4.1, N1 kN2  N2 kN3 since N1  N3 , and N2 kN3  N3 kN4
since N2  N4 . Given N1 kN2  N2 kN3  N3 kN4 , according to Theorem 2.4.1 we conclude
N1 kN2  N3 kN4 .
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compose(G1 , G2 )
unexplored = {s01 , s02 }
while unexplored 6= {}
(s1 , s2 ) = select( unexplored )
explored = explored ∪(s1 , s2 )
foreach t1 in G1 where w(t2 ) ∈
/ W (G2 )
if R1 (s1 , t1 , s01 ) then
R((s1 , s2 ), t, (s01 , s2 ))
if (s01 , s2 ) ∈
/ explored then
unexplored = { unexplored ∪(s01 , s2 )}
if R1 (s1 , t1 , π) then
R((s1 , s2 ), t, π)
end foreach
foreach t2 in G2 where w(t2 ) ∈
/ W (G1 )
if R2 (s2 , t, s02 ) then
R((s1 , s2 ), t, (s1 , s02 ))
if (s1 , s02 ) ∈
/ explored then
unexplored = { unexplored ∪(s1 , s02 )}
if R2 (s2 , t, π) then
R((s1 , s2 ), t, π)
end foreach
foreach t1 in G1 and t2 in G2 where w(t1 ) ∈ D and w(t2 ) ∈ D
if R1 (s1 , t1 , s01 ) and R2 (s2 , t2 , s02 ) and w(t1 ) = w(t2 ) then
R((s1 , s2 ), t, (s01 , s02 ))
if (s01 , s02 ) ∈
/ explored then
unexplored = { unexplored ∪(s01 , s02 )}
if R1 (s1 , t1 , π) and R2 (s2 , t2 , s02 ) and w(t1 ) = w(t2 ) then
R((s1 , s2 ), t, π)
if R1 (s1 , t1 , s01 ) and R2 (s2 , t2 , π) and w(t1 ) = w(t2 ) then
R((s1 , s2 ), t, π)
if R1 (s1 , t1 , π) and R2 (s2 , t2 , π) and w(t1 ) = w(t2 ) then
R((s1 , s2 ), t, π)
end foreach
end while

Figure 2.4 STG composition algorithm
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CHAPTER 3
COMPOSITIONAL MINIMIZATION AND VERIFICATION

In this chapter, we describe our compositional approach to verification. The traditional
flat approach fails when state space explosion occurs for large design models. Our methodology builds on the previous work of compositional verification. Like traditional compositional
verification, we individually examine components of a system and then merge the results
to form a global STG. To produce a reduced global STG which is an abstract model of
the concrete global STG, the STG for each component is abstracted to reduce complexity.
The reduced STGs are then incrementally composed. After each composition, the STG
is again abstracted to remove state transitions that have been made internal by composition. When composition is complete, the global STG models the interface behavior of the
concrete global STG. Throughout this approach, we preserve failures during composition
and abstraction therefore no failure can be missed. We also prove that our compositional
approach is sound in that no false positive results can be produced.
3.1

Framework of the Compositional Method
This section presents a general framework of compositional verification. In our method,

a circuit is modeled as a set of parallel components formally described using BGPNs. Each
BGPN describes a single component. Rather than attack the complexity of the complete
system, components are assessed autonomously. Each component BGPN is extracted from
the complete system and composed with another BGPN describing an over-approximated
environment. The over-approximated environment reproduces all input behavior that would
be supplied by the actual environment and perhaps more. State space exploration is then
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verify(N = N1 k · · · kNn )
find STG Gi for Ni kEiapprox (1 ≤ i ≤ n)
forall 1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, and i 6= j,
G = compose(Gi , Gj )
if π reachable from s0 of G then
return ”N has an failure”
else
return ”N is correct”
end if

Figure 3.1 Compositional verification algorithm
performed on each component to obtain an STG. Each STG describes all behavior a component can produce when it is embedded in the complete system. Then the component
STGs are incrementally composed to form a global STG describing the complete system.
The algorithm for compositional verification is shown in Figure 3.1.
n

The complete system N is described as the composition || Ni where each BGPN Ni
i=1

describes a component of N . We begin by regarding the rest of the system as E i , the
n

environment to Ni . For the component Ni , let Eiactual denote the actual environment || Nj
j=1

where j 6= i. Equation 3.1 describes the relationship between N and N i kEiactual for all i.
N ≡ Ni kEiactual

(3.1)

Often Eiactual is a very complex BGPN. Eiactual may contain many wires that are invisible
to Ni . The wires invisible to Ni in the BGPN Ni kEiactual may significantly contribute
to state space explosion when finding G(N i kEiactual ). To remove these invisible wires and
decouple the component from its actual environment, we devise E iapprox which is an overapproximation of Eiactual .
Definition 3.1.1. Given an arbitrary BGPN N , we say E approx is an over-approximation of
E actual if G(N kE actual )  G(N kE approx ).
An over-approximated environment is simpler than the actual environment and exhibits
at least as much behavior as the actual environment on the interface wires facilitating
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communication between Ni and Ei . For now we omit the procedure to produce such an
approximation.
For each component in the complete system N , the algorithm seen in Figure 3.1 composes component Ni with its over-approximated environment E iapprox . State space exploration is then performed on each BGPN N i kEiapprox to form an STG Gi . The component
STGs Gi are then incrementally composed to form the global STG G. Theorem 3.1.1 proves
that STG G produced by the flat approach conforms to the global STG G 0 produced by the
compositional approach. According to Definition 2.4.1, P(G) ⊆ P(G 0 ) such that all failure
traces in G also appear in G 0 . Therefore, if the failure state π is reachable from the initial
state in the final composition G 0 , then we cannot say the design is failure free. However,
if there is no path from the initial state to the failure state, we can conclude the complete
design is failure free.
n

Theorem 3.1.1. Let N = || Ni , G be the STG derived from N , and Gi0 be the STG derived
i=1

from Ni kEiapprox where 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The following equation holds:

n

G  || Gi0
i=1

Proof: For 1 ≤ i ≤ n, Eiactual is the composition of all the BGPNs of N excluding N i .
n

Therefore, N ≡ || Ni ≡ Ni kEiactual . Let Gi be the STG derived from Ni kEiactual and Gi0 be
i=1

the STG derived from Ni kEiapprox . According to Definition 3.1.1, Gi  Gi0 . Similarly for 1 ≤
j ≤ n, Gj is the STG derived from Nj kEjactual , and Gj0 is the STG derived from Nj kEjapprox .
Since N ≡ Ni kEiactual ≡ Nj kEjactual , G ≡ Gi ≡ Gj . Then according to Lemma 2.4.2,
G  Gi0 kGj0 . The above argument can be repeated for all 1 ≤ i,j ≤ n, proving Theorem 3.1.1.

3.2

Abstraction
The compositional approach is chosen when the resources required by the flat approach

exceed the available resources. The final STG produced by the algorithm seen in Figure 3.1
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is at least as large as the STG produced in the flat approach. If the STG produced by the
compositional approach is as large as that of the flat approach, the compositional approach
holds no advantage. In order to reduce complexity and remain within the confines of
available resources, abstraction is added to the compositional method.
In this section, we describe a method of abstraction that preserves the soundness of
compositional verification. Abstraction removes details unnecessary to verification. To
ensure the soundness of the abstraction method, traces are never removed from the possible
trace set. Rather, traces are shortened by removing the unnecessary events from a trace.
Any trace ending in the failure state will still end in the failure state after abstraction. We
begin by partitioning the set of wires W of a component into two sets V and D where W =
V ∪ D. V is the set of interface wires and D is the set of internal wires. Given a component’s
STG Gi , a wire w ∈ W may be either an interface wire or an internal wire. Interface wires
facilitate intercomponent communication. The interface wires of a component can be either
inputs denoted I or outputs denoted O. The set of wires D only provide intracomponent
communication. State transitions on these wires are not visible to other components. During
abstraction, all state transitions on the wires in D are removed while state transitions on
the wires in V are preserved. This results in a black box representation of the component
where state transitions only occur on input and output wires.
Suppose there exists a state transition (s i , t0 , sj ) in an STG G where w(t0 ) ∈ D. To
abstract this state transition, we simply combine s i and sj to form a single merged state
sij . All state transitions that either entered or exited s i now enter or exit sij . The result
is the same for state transitions entering or exiting s j . Then the state transition t0 in G
is deleted. To preserve failure traces, if s j is the failure state π, then the state formed by
merging si and sj is also the failure state π. By strictly adhering to this rule, failure traces
are never lost. An example of abstraction is shown in Figure 3.2.
A side-effect of abstraction is that the possible trace set may be enlarged. For the STG
G seen in Figure 3.3(a), all traces begin with the prefix (t 0 , t1 , t2 · · ·). After abstracting t0 ,
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Figure 3.2 (a) STG before abstraction of t 0 (b) STG after abstraction of t0
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Figure 3.3 (a) STG before producing additional traces (b) STG after producing additional
traces

the trace set for G has been enlarged such that all traces begin with the prefix (t 0 , t1 , t2 , · · ·)
or (t0 , t3 , · · ·). The abstracted STG containing additional traces is shown in Figure 3.3(b).
Additional failure traces created by abstraction are known as false failures. These false
failures do not threaten the correctness of our method, but introducing additional false
failures can increase the resource usage required during failure trace refinement. By first
abstracting state transitions adjacent to the failure state, we can prevent abstraction from
producing some false failures. Figure 3.4(a) shows an STG G containing two abstractable
state transitions t03 and t04 . If we abstract state transition t04 before t03 , The trace σ =
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Figure 3.4 (a) STG before abstraction (b) Abstracted STG containing addition failure traces
(c) Abstracted STG that does not contain additional failure traces

(t0 , t03 , τ ∗ ) is added to the trace set. The resulting STG is seen in Figure 3.4(b). However, if
we first abstract t03 , the state transition closest to the failure state, no new traces are added
to the STG. The abstracted STG containing no additional traces is shown in Figure 3.4(c).
The abstraction algorithm shown in Figure 3.5 attempts to avoid introducing false failures
whenever possible by first abstracting internal transitions adjacent to the failure state.
To contain state space explosion during the compositional approach, we augment the
original compositional verification algorithm to include abstraction. Before each composition, we abstract the STGs supplied as input to the composition function. Given any
substantial number of internal wires, the composition can be significantly smaller than one
for which the input STGs were not abstracted. The STG produced by composition with abstraction is usually much less complex than the STG produced by the flat approach. In order
to maintain the soundness of the verification algorithm, G must conform to abstract(G).
As previously discussed, abstraction never removes traces from P(G), but simply shortens
existing traces. In some cases, it may add traces to the possible trace set. Fortunately
conformance allows this to happen. The following theorem proves that an STG G conforms
to its abstraction G 0 .
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abstract(G)
foreach (si , t, π) ∈ R where w(t) ∈ D(G)
foreach (sj , t0 , si ) ∈ R
replace (sj , t0 , si ) with (sj , t0 , π)
foreach (si , t0 , sj ) ∈ R
replace (si , t0 , sj ) with (π, τ, π)
S π = S π ∪ {sj }
delete R(si , t, π)
foreach si ∈ S π
if unreachable(si)
foreach (si , t, sj ) ∈ R
replace R(si , t, sj ) with R(π, τ, π)
S π = S π ∪ {sj }
foreach (si , t, sj ) ∈ R where w(t) ∈ D(G)
delete R(si , t, sj )
foreach (sk , t0 , si ) ∈ R
replace (sk , t0 , si ) with (sk , t0 , sij )
foreach (si , t0 , sk ) ∈ R
replace (si , t0 , sk ) with (sij , t0 , sk )
foreach (sk , t0 , sj ) ∈ R
replace (sk , t0 , sj ) with (sk , t0 , sij )
foreach (sj , t0 , sk ) ∈ R
replace (sj , t0 , sk ) with (sij , t0 , sk )

Figure 3.5 Internal state transition abstraction algorithm
Theorem 3.2.1. Given an STG G where V = W − D , G[V]  abstract(G).
Proof: G[V]  abstract(G) if for every σ ∈ P(G) there exists σ 0 ∈ P(abstract(G)) such
that σ[V] ≡ σ 0 . Let (sh , ti , si ) ∈ R, (si , t0 , sj ) ∈ R, and (sj , tj , sk ) ∈ R where where
w(t0 ) ∈
/ V. For each (si , t0 , sj ) ∈ R, there are one or more paths in G containing (s i , t0 , sj ). A
tj

t0

t

i
path in G containing (si , t0 , sj ) is ρ = (· · · sh →
si → sj → sk · · ·). The trace corresponding

to ρ is σ = (· · · , ti , t0 , tj , · · ·). To abstract (si , t0 , sj ), the states si and sj are merged to form
a single state sij . Then the state transition (si , t0 , sj ) is then deleted from R. This process
is repeated for each instance of (s, t 0 , s0 ) ∈ R in the path ρ where the BGPN transition
t

tj

i
t0 ∈
/ V. As a result, abstract(ρ) = ρ0 = (· · · sh →
sij → sk · · ·). Its corresponding trace is

σ 0 = (· · · , ti , tj , · · ·) where all ti and tj retain their relative order. If we project the trace σ
to the set of wires V, according to the definition of the projection function in Chapter 2,
the result (· · · , ti , tj , · · ·) is equivalent to σ 0 . The same argument is applied for all traces in
G. Since P(G)[W 0 ] ⊆ P(abstract(G)), by Definition 2.4.1 G[V]  abstract(G).
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autofailure(G)
foreach (sj , t, π) ∈ R where w(t) ∈
/ I(G)
if sj = s0
return component failure
replace (sj , t, π) with (π, τ, π)
foreach (si , t, sj ) ∈ R
replace (si , t, sj ) with (si , t, π)
foreach (sj , t, sk ) ∈ R
S π = S π ∪ {sk }
replace (sj , t, sk ) with (π, τ, π)
foreach si ∈ S π
if unreachable(si)
foreach (si , t, sj ) ∈ R
replace (si , t, sj ) with (π, τ, π)
S π = S π ∪ {sj }

Figure 3.6 Algorithm to backward propagate failures

3.3

Failure Backward Propagation
The failure state of an STG may be caused by an output or internal BGPN transition

firing. However, in most cases the cause of the failure can be traced back to an input BGPN
transition where the environment supplied some input the design could not handle. If an
output or internal BGPN transition firing causes a failure, the state from which the BGPN
transition fires is also a failure state. We refer to these states as failure states because the
environment cannot prevent the failure from occurring. [21] refers to this new failure state
as the autofailure state. However, [21] presents autofailure as a means of canonicalizing
automatons representing asynchronous circuit designs. Like [21], we consider potential
failure states to be failure states, though our motive differs. Our method is similar to [25]
in that by treating potential failure states as actual failure states, we are able to reduce the
size of an STG. In this section, we describe a method of shortening the representation of
traces in an STG through autofailure reduction.
When a failure occurs, its autofailure state can be found by traversing each path in
the STG backwards from π until an input event is reached. The state transition (s i , t, π)
replaces (si , t, sj ) where t is the input event found in the previous step, and all states that
were reachable from sj are marked as failure states. The algorithm shown in Figure 3.6
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starts from the failure state π, and checks all incoming paths to π backwards. If, whenever
during backward traversal, the initial state is encountered before an input transition is
found, that indicates the component fails right from the initial state, and it is reported
back to users right away. Otherwise, suppose there is a failure state transition (s j , t, π)
where the BGPN transition t is not an input. The state s j is marked as a failure state, and
the BGPN transition t is represented as τ . Then every state transition (s i , t, sj ) is updated
to (si , t, π). This process repeats until only state transitions on inputs enter the failure
state. Then every state transition (s k , t, sl ) that is reachable from the new autofailure state
is changed to (π, τ, π).
Figure 3.7(a) is an STG consisting on input and non-input state transitions. The input
transitions are denoted as (s, t, s0 ) where t ∈ I. Similarly we use (s, t0 , s0 ) where t0 ∈
/ I
to represent an output or internal transition. Autofailure reduction begins by locating a
non-input state transition to the failure state. The state transition (s k , t0 , π) is found, and
the potential failure state sk is marked as a failure state. Afterward, we convert the state
transition (sk , t0 , π) to (π, τ, π). By repeating this process we find another non-input state
transition (si , t0 , π) entering the failure state. The process is repeated and s i is marked
as failure. Then states reachable from a failure state are marked as failure states. After
autofailure, the state transition (π, τ, π) represents all transitions that exit the failure states
and potential failure states.
Like abstraction, applying autofailure reduction immediately before each composition
safely reduces peak complexity. Autofailure is safe because it does not remove traces from
the possible trace set of a design. Chapter 2 introduced the special state transition (π, τ, π)
which represents behavior occurring after the failure state with less detail. By applying
backwards failure propagation, we reduced the size of state transition graph by representing
many BGPN transition firings with the single state transition (π, τ, π). This creates an STG
smaller in size. Theorem 3.3.1 proves that the STG G conforms to the autofailure of G.
Theorem 3.3.1. Given an STG G, G  autofailure(G).
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Figure 3.7 (a) STG before autofailure reduction (b) STG after autofailure reduction

Proof: Let G be an STG representing the firings of BGPN transitions t and t 0 where w(t) ∈ I
t

t

t0

t0

τ

τ

and w(t0 ) ∈
/ I. Let ρ be a path in G such that ρ = (· · · → si → sj → sk → π → π → · · ·).
Its corresponding traces is σ = (· · · , t, t, t 0 , t0 , τ ∗ ). Performing autofailure on G relabels the
t

t

states and state transitions of ρ such that autofailure(ρ) = ρ 0 and ρ0 = (· · · → si →
τ

τ

τ

τ

π → π → π → π → · · ·). σ 0 is the trace corresponding to ρ0 where σ 0 = (· · · , t, t, τ ∗ ). After
autofailure reduction, the trace σ = (· · · , t, t, t 0 , t0 , τ ∗ ) has been reduced to σ 0 = (· · · , t, t, τ ∗ ).
Recall that τ ∗ represents an infinite number of arbitrary transition firings in a BGPN N ,
thus the trace σ 0 = (· · · , t, t, τ ∗ ) is equivalent to the trace σ 00 = (· · · , t, t, τ, τ, τ ∗ ). In the
case of σ 00 , each τ represents a corresponding t 0 in σ, thus σ and σ 0 are equivalent traces
differing only in notation. Given that P(G) ⊆ P(autofailure(G)), by Definition 2.4.1 we
know G  autofailure(G).
3.4

Maximal Environment
As discussed above, we wish to decouple a component from the rest of the design by

replacing the actual environment with an over-approximated environment. The simplest
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approach is to use a maximal environment. The concept of the maximal environment was
introduced in [5]. The maximal environment for a component may produce any event on
any input wire at any moment. Its behavior is larger than any other environment possible
for the same component in terms of conformance. The maximal environment is formally
described in Definition 3.4.1.
Definition 3.4.1. Given an arbitrary BGPN N , we say E max is the maximal environment to
N if G(N kE)  G(N kE max ) for all E.
The more input behavior supplied to a design, the more output behavior that design may
exude in response to the input. Design N would display all possible behavior if composed
with the maximal environment. Therefore, E max is an over-approximated environment. The
maximal environment defines behavior for all input wires of a design. The behavior of each
input wire is completely independent to other input wires; how each input wire changes its
values is completely non-deterministic. In other words, the behavior of each input wire is
unconstrained. Figure 2.2 in the previous chapter shows an AND-gate driven by a maximal
environment. We also note that every design has an unique maximal environment.
3.5

Composition with Reduction
In the previous sections we have seen two methods to reduce the complexity of an STG.

Both abstraction and autofailure may be combined to minimize the size of the final STG.
For now, we choose our approximated environment to be the maximal environment because
finding a more accurate approximation is non-trivial. Figure 3.8 shows an augmented verification algorithm that includes abstraction and autofailure. This new algorithm performs
reductions on the STGs immediately before composition. Theorem 3.2.1 proves that any
STG Gi conforms to its autofailure reduction G i0 . Also, Theorem 3.3.1 proves that any
STG Gi0 conforms to its abstraction Gi00 . By using the output of autofailure as the input to
abstraction, we can apply Lemma 2.4.1 and conclude G i  Gi0  Gi00 .
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verify(N = N1 k · · · kNn )
find STG Gi for Ni kEimax (1 ≤ i ≤ n)
∀1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and i 6= j,
G = compose(autofailure(abstract(Gi )), autofailure(abstract(Gj )))
if π reachable from s0 of G then
return ”N has an failure”
else
return ”N is correct”

Figure 3.8 Compositional verification algorithm with autofailure and abstraction
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CHAPTER 4
STATE SPACE REFINEMENT WITH CONSTRAINTS

As described in the previous chapter, compositional verification performs state space exploration for each component in the system. For each component, an over-approximated
environment is used in place of the actual environment. A maximal environment is the
worst case approximation. The input behaviors supplied by the over-approximated environment are a superset of those supplied by the actual environment. Supplying additional
input behaviors can cause a design to produce additional output behavior. This extra behavior creates inessential state space during state space exploration. Inessential state space
describes behavior which cannot occur when the component is embedded within its actual
environment. Sometimes this inessential state space is removed when a component’s STG is
composed with the STG of its actual environment. However, the temporary existence of this
inessential state space increases the peak number of states in the intermediate STGs during
composition. The most undesirable outcome is for the inessential state space to appear in
the final global STG. Larger state space consumes more memory and increases computation
time. The inessential state space may also contain false failures. Every failure produced
by our method must be verified through counter example refinement. Eliminating false
failures can expedite the refinement and verification of true design failures. In this chapter,
we present a method of constraint derivation that attempts to reduce these extra states by
generating a more accurate approximation of the environment. This method can be used
along with the reduction methods described in the previous chapter to further contain the
peak size of the intermediate results during composition. We wish to produce a constrained
over-approximated environment, E iconstrained such that E actual  E constrained  E approx . We
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first give the definition of constraints and how they affect BGPN firing semantics. We then
describe how to derive them.
4.1

Constraint Definition
To create a more accurate approximation, we restrict the firings of BGPN transitions

when their occurrence would cause an STG to enter inessential state space. In general, a
constraint imposes additional logic for a BGPN transition firing that prevents such a transition from being fired unless the imposed constraint is satisfied. In a BGPN, a constraint
is associated with each transition. The augmented definition of BGPNs including a boolean
constraint mapping function C is given as follows.
Definition 4.1.1. A BGPN N is the tuple (W, T, P, F, µ 0 , L, B, C) where C is the boolean
constraint labeling function such that C : T → b where b is a boolean expression over W ,
while the other elements in N are defined the same as in Definition 2.1.1.
The addition of the constraint mapping function changes the BGPN firing semantics.
First, let c(t) denote the constraint labeling a BGPN transition t ∈ T . Recall that the
function eval(s, b), where s = (µ, α), returns true if b evaluates to true with α and false
otherwise.
Definition 4.1.2. Let N be a BGPN, and s a state of N . Given a BGPN transition t ∈ T ,
its constraint c(t) is satisfied at a state s if eval(s, c(t)) = true.
For a BGPN transition to be enabled at a state, all enabling rules must be satisfied at
that state; plus, the transition’s constraint must also be satisfied at the same state. The
modified definition of the BGPN transition enabling condition is given in Definition 4.1.3.
Definition 4.1.3. Let N be a BGPN, and s a state of N . A transition t ∈ T is enabled at
state s if


enabling rules(t) = satisfied(t, s)
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∧





eval(s, c(t)) = true .

The addition of constraints also requires modification of our failure definitions. The
previous definition stated that a BGPN transition firing causes a failure if certain a condition
is satisfied. With constraints, failure conditions are restricted and valid only when the
constraints are also satisfied. In other words, transition firings are not considered when
the constraints are not satisfied, even though these firings would cause failures without
considering constraints. The updated failure definitions are given as follows.
t

t

0
1
Definition 4.1.4. Let ρ = (s0 →
s1 →
s2 · · ·) be a path in a STG G where R(si , ti , si+1 ) for

all i ≥ 0, and c(ti ) a constraint on ti such that eval(si , c(ti )) = true for all i ≥ 1. Firing
ti causes
1. A safety failure if (µ(si ) − •ti ) ∩ ti • 6= ∅.
2. A complement failure if
a. ti = w + ∧α(si )[w] = 1, or
b. ti = w − ∧α(si )[w] = 0.
3. A disabling failure if (enabled(s i ) − {ti }) 6⊆ enabled(si+1 ).
4. A deadlock if enabled(si+1 ) = ∅.
In a STG G = (N, S, R, s0 ), a BGPN transition t ∈ T is enabled at a state s ∈ S if
R(s, t, s0 ) holds. According to the definition of constraints described above, a constraint
is a condition that must be satisfied in every state where the BGPN transition is enabled.
Therefore, c(t) corresponds to a set of state transitions R c(t) ⊆ R such that BGPN transition
t is enabled and its constraint c(t) is satisfied at state s for every (s, t, s 0 ) ∈ Rc(t) . Obviously,
the following property holds.

c1 (t) → c2 (t) ⇔ Rc1 (t) ⊆ Rc2 (t)

(4.1)

where c1 (t) and c2 (t) are two constraints on t. This property states that the behavior in a
model regarding t is reduced by imposing a stronger constraint on t, and vice versa. For
example, Rc2 (t) includes all state transitions (s, t, s 0 ) ∈ R if c2 (t) = true, and Rc1 (t) ⊆ Rc2 (t)
for all other c1 (t). Let C(T 0 ) be a set of constraints for all BGPN transitions in T 0 ⊆ T .
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C1 (T 0 ) → C2 (T 0 ) if c1 (t) → c2 (t) for every t ∈ T 0 . It is easy to see that the following
property also holds.
C1 (T 0 ) → C2 (T 0 ) ⇔ RC1 (T 0 ) ⊆ RC2 (T 0 )
where Rc(T 0 ) =

S

(4.2)

Rc(t) for all t ∈ T 0 and c(t) ∈ C(T 0 ).

Given a BGPN N and a set of constraints C 0 (T 0 ) such that T 0 ⊆ T , we denote the
imposition of constraints on N as N ↑ C 0 (T 0 ). This function updates the constraints of N
with C 0 (T 0 ) as shown in Definition 4.1.5.
Definition 4.1.5. Let N be a BGPN and C 0 (T 0 ) be a set of constraints. N ↑ C 0 (T 0 ) updates
C(T ) of N as follows.

∀ t ∈ T. c(t) =



 c(t) ∧ c0 (t)[W ]

 c(t)

if t ∈ T 0
otherwise

This definition ensures that constraint update does not weaken the existing constraints
in a BGPN. Since imposing constraints on BGPN transitions of a model reduces the possible
state transitions caused by firing these BGPN transitions, this reduces the number of traces
produced by state space exploration. We can also conclude that one constraint is stronger
than the other if one model displays less behavior then the other in terms of possible traces.
This conclusion is formalized in Lemma 4.1.1.
Lemma 4.1.1. Let N = (W, T, P, F, µ0 , L, B, C) be a BGPN, C1 (T ) and C2 (T ) two constraints on T . C1 (T ) → C2 (T ) if and only if N ↑ C1 (T )  N ↑ C2 (T )
t

0
Proof: First, we prove that N ↑ C1 (T )  N ↑ C2 (T ) if C1 (T ) → C2 (T ). Let ρ = (s0 →

t

1
· · ·) be a path in G(N ) such that it satisfies the conditions
s1 →

eval(si , c1 (ti )) = true and R(si , ti , si+1 ) holds for all i ≥ 0

where c1 (ti ) ∈ C1 (T ). We can find all paths satisfying the above condition and group them
t

t

1
0
· · ·) ∈ P(N ↑ C1 (T )) also satisfies
s1 →
in P(N ↑ C1 (T )). Since C1 (T ) → C2 (T ), ρ = (s0 →
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the conditions

eval(si , c2 (ti ) = true and R(si , ti , si+1 ) holds for all i ≥ 0

where c2 (ti ) ∈ C2 (T ). Similarly, we can group all paths satisfying the above condition
in P(N ↑ C2 (T )). Obviously, P(N ↑ C1 (T )) ⊆ P(N ↑ C2 (T )). Then according to the
definition of conformance, we have N ↑ C 1 (T )  N ↑ C2 (T ).
Next, we prove that C1 (T ) → C2 (T ) if N ↑ C1 (T )  N ↑ C2 (T ). Since N ↑ C1 (T ) 
t

t

0
1
N ↑ C2 (T ), every ρ = (s0 →
s1 →
· · ·) ∈ P(N ↑ C1 (T )) is also in P(N ↑ C2 (T )). Let RC1 (T )

and RC2 (T ) be the sets of state transitions extracted from every path in P(N ↑ C 1 (T )) and
P(N ↑ C2 (T )), respectively. And we have RC1 (T ) ⊆ RC2 (T ) . According to Equation 4.2, we
have C1 (T ) → C2 (T ). This completes the proof.
Lemma 4.1.2. Let N1 and N2 be two BGPNs, C(T ) constraints on T . If N 1  N2 , then
N1 ↑ C(T )  N2 ↑ C(T ).
t

t

1
0
· · ·) in
s1 →
Proof: Since N1  N2 , we have P(N1 ) ⊆ P(N2 ). For every path ρ = (s0 →

P(N1 ) such that for all i ≥ 0 c(ti ) is satisfied at state si on ρ where c(ti ) ∈ C(T ), it must be
in P(N2 ) too. Since such a path belongs to P(N 1 ↑ C(T )), it also belongs to P(N2 ↑ C(T )).
According to the definition of conformance, we have N 1 ↑ C(T )  N2 ↑ C(T ).
Next, we show a lemma that is trivial but useful for proving a theorem later in this
chapter.
Lemma 4.1.3. Let N be a BGPN, and C(T ) constraints on T such that every c(t i ) ∈ C(T )
t

t

1
0
· · ·) in P(N ). Then,
s1 →
is satisfied at state si for all i ≥ 0 on every path ρ = (s0 →

N  (N ↑ C(T )), and (N ↑ C(T ))  N.
t

t

1
0
· · ·) in P(N ), every c(ti ) ∈ C(T ) is satisfied at state si
s1 →
Proof: For every ρ = (s0 →

for all i ≥ 0, therefore, this path belongs to P(N ↑ C(T )). According to the definition of
conformance, N  N ↑ C(T ).
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To prove N ↑ C(T )  N , first notice that N is the same as N ↑ C 0 (T ) where for every
t ∈ T , c0 (ti ) ∈ C 0 (T ) is true. Obviously, C(T ) → C 0 (T ). According to Lemma 4.1.1,
N ↑ C(T )  N holds.
4.2

Constraint Derivation
In this section, we first describe how to derive the boolean constraint for a two com-

ponent design. Next, we describe the more general case where a system consists of many
components. We then show a simple example of constraint generation. Finally, we prove
that constraint derivation does not invalidate the soundness of our compositional method.
Consider a two component system consisting of N i and Nj where I(Ni ) ∩ O(Nj ) 6= ∅. If
we wish to perform constrained compositional verification, an over-approximated environment must be applied to each BGPN. Now suppose we wish to refine the over-approximated
environment applied to Ni . The first step in constrained compositional verification is to
produce the STG G(Nj kEjapprox ), which we denote as Gj . Now, Gj is regarded as the en



vironment to Ni . For each wire wj ∈ I(Ni ) ∩ O(Nj ) , we examine Gj and identify the
states where wj + and wj − are enabled to fire. These states are collected and stored in
two sets. S + is the set of states in the STG where w j + is enabled, and S − is the set of
states where wj − is enabled. The state vectors of S + are disjuncted to form the boolean
expression c(wj +). Similarly, the state vectors of S − are disjuncted to form the boolean
expression c(wj −). At this point c(wj +) is a boolean expression describing the states in
the STG Gj where the BGPN transition wj + may be fired. Equally importantly, the negation of c(wj +) describes states where the BGPN transition w j + cannot be fired. c(wj −)
provides a similar stipulation for the BGPN transition w j −. Repeating this procedure for




all wj ∈ I(Ni ) ∩ O(Nj ) produces the set of constraints Cj , which is applied to BGPN Ni
when it is considered. The algorithm for constraint derivation is shown in Figure 4.1.
Constraint derivation is similar for designs containing multiple components. Let us
n

consider a design where the composition || Ni forms the complete system N . From the
i=1
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constrainPN(G, N )

foreach w ∈ I(N ) ∩ O(G)
S + = {s ∈ S | R(si , t, si+1 ) and t = w+}
S − = {s ∈ S | R(sj , t, sj+1 ) and t = w−}
for all s1 ∈ S + and s2 ∈ S +
c(w+) = α(s1 ) ∨ α(s2 )
for all s1 ∈ S − and s2 ∈ S −
c(w−) = α(s1 ) ∨ α(s2 )
C = C ∪ c(w+) ∪ c(w−)
return (N ↑ C)

Figure 4.1 Algorithm to constrain an input of a BGPN
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Figure 4.2 (a) Circuit diagram of an inverter composed with a buffer (b) G(N 1 kE1max ) where
each binary vector corresponds to the wires x, y, and z

n

set of components we select a BGPN Ni . For Ni , its environment is || Nj where j 6= i.
j=1

For each Nj kEj we produce an STG Gj from which Cj can be derived. We then constrain
the environment of Ni by imposing constraints such that N i kEi ↑ Cj for all Cj .
As a simple example, Figure 4.2 (a) shows a circuit diagram of an inverter composed
with a buffer. For this example, we shall consider the single inverter to be N 2 and the buffer
to be N1 . During constrained compositional verification, we apply a maximal environment
to both N1 and N2 . We then perform state space exploration and autofailure reduction on
N1 kE1max . G(N1 kE1max ) after reduction is shown in Figure 4.2(b). We now wish to constrain
the BGPN N2 kE2max shown in Figure 4.3(a). z is the only wire in the set I(N i ) ∩ O(Nj ).
We search G(N1 kE1max ) and store each state enabling z+ in the set S + . Similarly, each
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N1 kE1max
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(N2 kE2max )

↑ C2

state enabling z− is stored in S − . From Figure 4.2(b) we see that S + and S − each contain
a single state. Disjuncting the state vectors in the set S + produces a boolean expression
c(z+) = xȳz̄. c(z−) = x̄yz is produced by disjuncting the state vectors of S − . In this
example, c(z+) and c(z−) form the set C 1 . We then impose C1 on the BGPN N2 kE2max using
the function (N2 kE2max ) ↑ C1 . By Definition 4.1.5, the boolean expression of each constraint
is projected to the set of wires W [N2 kE2max ]. Then the derived constraints on wire z are
conjuncted with existing constraint on z. For the maximal environment, constraints on z are
true. Constraint imposition updates the constraints for N 2 kE2max such that c2 (z+) = xz̄
and c2 (z−) = x̄z. The constrained BGPN (N2 kE2max ) ↑ C2 is shown in Figure 4.3(b). The
reduction in inessential state space is shown in Figure 4.4, where the STG in Figure 4.4(a)
is derived from N2 kE2max and the STG in Figure 4.4(b) is derived from N 2 kE2max ↑ C2 .
The following theorem proves that our method of deriving and applying constraints to
our compositional verification method maintains soundness
Theorem 4.2.1. Let N = Ni kNj , Nj  Eiapprox , and Ni  Ejapprox . Also, let C(T ) be the
constraints derived for T of N from G(N j kEjapprox ). The following equation holds:
Ni kNj  (Ni kEiapprox ) ↑ C(T )
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Proof: Let Cij , Ci , and Cj be constraints derived from Ni kNj , Ni kEiapprox , and Ejapprox kNj ,
respectively, and Cj = C(T ). According to Lemma 4.1.3, we have

Ni kNj  (Ni kNj ) ↑ Cij .

(4.3)

Since (Ni kNj )  (Ni kEiapprox ), according to Lemma 4.1.2, we have
(Ni kNj ) ↑ Cij  (Ni kEiapprox ) ↑ Cij

(4.4)

Since (Ni kNj )  (Nj kEjapprox ), according to Lemma 4.1.1, Cij → Cj holds. Next, according
to Lemma 4.1.2, we can have the following equation:
(Ni kEjapprox ) ↑ Cij  (Ni kEjapprox ) ↑ Cj
Combining Equation 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, and C j = C(T ), we can conclude that
Ni kNj  Ni kEiapprox ↑ C(T )
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(4.5)

CHAPTER 5
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS

The methods discussed in previous chapters have been implemented in the verification tool
SoftInspect. To test the results of our reduction method we performed verification on three
asynchronous designs: a FIFO controller, a tree arbiter, and a distributed mutual exclusion
circuit. All designs have regular structures, thus simplifying creation of larger designs by
replicating the same cells. However, the regularity is not exploited in all experiments.
The FIFO controller chosen is self-timed controlled as described in [22]. Figure 5.1
provides a high level description of a FIFO with n cells. The component connected to
the left side of the FIFO is the producer. The right side of the FIFO is connected to the
consumer. When the producer wishes to insert data into the FIFO, it first checks to see if
there is room for additional data. If additional room exists, the data is added to the FIFO
data structure. When the FIFO is not empty, it signals the consumer. The consumer then
consumes the data after a period of time.
When the producer wishes to insert data, it makes a request by setting the value of
wire li to high. The FIFO stores the data supplied by the producer. Then the FIFO
acknowledges the producer by setting lo to high. After receiving the acknowledgment, the
producer changes li to low. Once the FIFO is ready to accept additional input, it lowers lo.
If the FIFO is full, lo remains high until the consumer consumes a unit of data. When the
li

ro

FIFO1

FIFO2

FIFO3

lo

FIFOn
ri

Figure 5.1 FIFO overview

42

li

ro

C

C

lo

ri

Figure 5.2 The control circuit for a single stage FIFO
Table 5.1 Truth table
a b
0 0
0 1
1 0
1 1

for the C-element
c
0
c
c
1

FIFO is ready to supply the consumer with data, ro is raised to high. Once the data is read,
the consumer acknowledges the FIFO by setting ri to high. When the data transaction is
completed, and the FIFO lowers its request on ro. The wire ri remains high until the
consumer finishes processing the data it read. ri is lowered when ro is low and all data
processing is completed. Figure 5.2 shows the control circuit for a single stage of the FIFO
without data storage.
The circuit consists of an AND-gate, a NOR-gate, and two C-elements. A C-element is
a common component of asynchronous circuit designs. It is represented as a circle with a
“C” in the center. The circuit has two inputs and a single output. Its output is low when
both inputs are also low. Similarly, its output is high when both inputs are high. The
C-element’s output retains its previous value for all other input vectors. The truth table
for the C-element is shown in Table 5.1.
The second design used in testing our method is the distributed mutual exclusion element
in [23]. The distributed mutual exclusion element (DME) is a self-timed circuit which
allows multiple devices to use a single shared resource. A master M may request access
to the shared resource by communicating with its server. For every master device, there
is one server. The servers are connected in a ring, and each server communicates with its
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slreq 3
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slack 4

slreq n−1
slack n

ack n

Servern

slreq n
slack 1

Figure 5.3 DME overview

neighboring servers. At any given time, one server in the ring holds ’privilege’. ’Privilege’
gives a server the exclusive right to grant its master access to the resource. Figure 5.3
shows the high level architecture of a design containing n masters and servers. If a server
has ’privilege’ and its master requests access to the resource, access can be immediately
granted. If the server is not ’privileged’, it requests privilege from the neighbor to its right.
If a server receives a request for privilege from its left-hand neighbor and it is unprivileged,
it propagates the request it the server on its right. When the request reaches a server
with privilege, privilege is passed to the left. In this manner, requests for privilege are
transmitted clockwise in the ring, while privilege is passed counter-clockwise in the ring
from one server to another. Should both the left neighbor and the master request access
to the resource at the same time, the circuit contains an arbiter which chooses exactly one
request to satisfy. Each DME cell also contains an SR-latch. The latch is set to high when
a server has privilege. The circuit implementation for a single DME cell is shown in Figure
5.4. Full details of the implementation may be found in [23].
The third circuit chosen to test our method is an arbiter. The arbiter described in
[21] allows several devices to share a resource. A single arbiter accepts requests from two
users and grants a single user access to a resource at any given time. To allow more users
to access the same resource, multiple arbiters may be connected as shown in Figure 5.5.
In a multi-celled arbiter, a cell lower in the hierarchy regards another cell higher in the
hierarchy as the server. For the experiments shown in this chapter, we connect the arbiters
as a complete or nearly complete binary tree.
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Figure 5.4 DME server circuit implementation
Figure 5.6 shows the circuit implementation for a single arbiter cell. In the arbiter
implementation, user requests for the resources are sent to a mutual exclusion element. The
mutual exclusion element ensures that the rest of the circuit receives exactly one request
for the resource at any time. When a user i makes a request, it sets the wire ur i to high.
The arbiter then requests access to the server by setting sr i to high and waits. When the
server grants the request, it raises sa to high. The arbiter propagates this message to the
user by setting uai to high. When the user finishes using the resource, it lowers ur i which
causes the arbiter to lower sr. The server then lowers sa. Then then arbiter lowers ua i ,
completing the transaction between the user and the server.
Compositional verification requires us to partition the design into components. For
simplicity we partition our designs such that each component consists of a single cell. The
order in which we chose to compose these components was dictated by the interface of each
design. In general, we attempted to minimize the number of interface signals present in
a component. To do this we strictly composed component with common interface wires.
This allows for early abstraction as interface wires become internal to a component after
composition. For the FIFO design, we begin with the cell adjacent to the producer and
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iteratively compose each adjacent cell until we reached the consumer. Since the DME
design is circular, where we begin began the process of composition has no effect. Optimal
composition for the DME design simply requires us to compose components with a common
interface and attempt to maintain components of a balanced size. For the arbiter example
we begin at the bottom of the tree and incrementally compose components as we move up
the tree. Because we form our arbiter trees as complete or nearly complete binary trees,
the components of the final composition are fairly balanced in size.
Table 5.2 shows the statistics of each design in BGPN and the verification results from
using the flat approach. Each row characterizes a design containing a particular number of
cells. Columns three, four, and five describe the sizes of designs in BGPN. |P | is the number
of places, |T | is the number of BGPN transitions, and |W | is the total number of wires in
a design. Columns six, seven, eight, nine, and ten describe an STG produced by flat state
space exploration. |S| is the number of states, and |R| is the number of state transitions.
Time is recorded in seconds and memory in megabytes. All time and memory statistics
greater than one are rounded. The column labeled π indicates whether or not the failure
state is reachable for an STG. From the table, we see that the size of the BGPNs grows
linearly while the size of the STGs grow exponentially as the number of cells increases.
With regard to the number of cells verified, the FIFO circuit seems to do well compare to
the other two designs. However, if we compare the FIFO design to the other designs in
terms of places, transitions, and wires, the FIFO design performs the poorest during flat
verification. This underscores the unpredictability of state space explosion. We note that
all of the designs are shown to be correct during flat verification.
Compositional verification of the same designs without using constraints is shown in
Table 5.3. For each component, the maximal environment is used as an over-approximated
environment. |SF | and |RF | describe the size of the global STG produced by compositional
verification. However, the more important metric of this method is the peak number of
states and state transitions. |SP | and |RP | describe the number of states and state transitions for the largest STG produced during verification. The FIFO experiments produce
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Table 5.2 Statistics for designs in BGPN and resources consumed by traditional flat approach
Design

FIFO

DME

ARB

# Cells
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Design Statistics
|P | |T | |W |
20
20
10
28
28
14
36
36
18
44
44
22
52
52
26
60
60
34
68
68
38
76
76
42
84
84
46
48
60
22
72
90
33
96 120
44
120 150
55
144 180
66
168 210
77
192 240
88
34
36
18
49
52
26
64
68
34
79
84
42
94 100
50
109 116
58
124 132
66

|S|
116
644
3620
20276
113684
*
*
*
*
1052
53094
*
*
*
*
*
444
3756
30164
227472
*
*
*

Flat
|R|
Time
240
<1
1724
<1
11968
1
79644
8
517520
72
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
2770
<1
215847
27
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
1054
<1
11600
1
116776
21
1041792
254
*
*
*
*
*
*

∗ Indicates the design was too large to complete.
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Mem
<1
<1
3
21
152
*
*
*
*
1
59
*
*
*
*
*
<1
4
36
347
*
*
*

π
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N

Table 5.3 Experimental results for compositional verification without constraints
Design

FIFO

DME

ARB

# Cells
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

|SF |
43
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
49
230
823
2467
7039
18735
48895
159
603
2254
4347
15083
24843
63275

|RF |
88
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
86
543
2444
8760
29040
87728
256000
377
1938
9163
20502
84278
147466
421110

|SP |
56
63
63
63
63
63
63
63
63
360
995
995
8335
8335
71859
71859
646
701
2254
4347
15083
24843
63275

|RP |
160
252
252
252
252
252
252
252
252
1236
4206
4206
42864
42864
436592
436592
2924
3485
9163
20502
84278
147466
421110

Time
<1
<1
<1
<1
<1
<1
<1
<1
<1
<1
<1
1
6
16
554
714.49
<1
<1
2
10
25
34
350

Mem
<1
<1
<1
<1
<1
1
1
1
1
1
3
5
20
38
189
350
1
2
5
13
31
49
123

π
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

extremely small results because each STG quickly enters the failure state. By using the
maximal environment, we have introduced false failures. We know these failures are false
because the flat STGs contained no failure states. These failures can also be proved false
using failure trace verification as described in [2]. The STGs for the DME designs contain
no failures. The resources consumed by compositional verification of DME are significantly
less than the flat approach. This is due to the many internal wires which we abstract. The
peak size of the arbiter is also much less than the flat STG. Unfortunately, the maximal
environment used in the compositional approach also produces false failures in the arbiter
examples.
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Table 5.4 shows the results of compositional verification with constraint generation. The
most apparent differences is the increased STG size for the FIFO designs. In the previous
method, the states and transitions that occurred after the false failures were recorded with
the single state transition (π, τ, π). By applying constraints, we have removed all of the
false failures from the FIFO design, thus increasing the size of the STG representation.
The FIFO design exhibits near linear growth under constrained verification and does not
requires failure trace verification. Applying constraints to the DME design reduces runtime, memory usage, and the size of the largest intermediate STG. For the DME design,
constrained verification produces the same verification results as unconstrained verification,
but it does it much more efficiently. This is because constraints eliminate most of the extra
behavior cause by the over-approximated environment. The benefits of constraints are not
as dramatic for the arbiter design. The constraints remove some false failures, but the final
global STG still contains failure. There is little benefit for the arbiter design with respect
to peak STG size, but constraints do decrease the run-time significantly by preventing some
extra behavior from appearing in the intermediate STGs.
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Table 5.4 Experimental results for compositional verification using constraints
Design

FIFO

DME

ARB

# Cells
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

|SF |
43
91
139
187
235
283
331
379
427
49
230
823
2467
7039
18735
122688
159
603
2254
4459
15511
25983
67711

|RF |
80
192
304
416
528
640
752
864
976
86
543
2444
8760
29040
87728
256000
377
1938
9163
20414
84492
146240
432728
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|SP |
56
91
139
187
235
283
331
379
427
360
447
775
3935
6815
34383
59540
646
701
2254
4459
15511
25983
67711

|RP |
160
192
304
416
528
640
752
864
976
1236
1152
2700
13872
30208
153424
319700
2924
3485
9163
20414
84492
146240
432728

Time
<1
<1
<1
<1
<1
<1
<1
<1
<1
<1
1
1
4
13
56
472
<1
2
3
11
24
28
286

Mem
<1
<1
<1
1
1
2
2
3
4
1
2
5
13
30
107
223
1
3
7
14
32
47
123

π
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION

Asynchronous designs contain complex protocols which may hide failures occurring deep
in the state space. Traditional approaches like simulation are unlikely to discover deep
failures. Because model checking exhaustively explores all the behavior of a design, it
either guarantees that a design is correct or produces a counter-example. The guarantee of
correctness comes with a heavy price. All approaches to model checking suffer from state
space explosion. This thesis has presented two methods to contain state space explosion
and efficiently verify asynchronous designs.
6.1

The Compositional Framework
As illustrated in Chapter 5, it is impossible to verify most designs as a single unit. By

partitioning a design, our method reduces concurrency which is the driving force of state
space explosion. Although approximating an environment may elicit additional behavior
from a component, our method scales much better than state space exploration of a flat design. Abstraction is largely responsible for producing state transition graphs of manageable
size. The greatest reductions occur when a component contains many concurrent internal
behaviors. Although the DME and arbiter examples show exponential growth in state space
under the compositional approach, there is a significant reduction in state space size relative
to the flat approach. Without constraints, our method fails to prove the correctness of the
arbiter and FIFO designs, but its strength is exemplified by correctly verifying four times as
many DME cells as the flat approach. An improved version of this method could use failure
trace verification and refinement to completely verify the FIFO and arbiter examples. This
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improvement would expand abstracted failure traces to create concrete failure traces. We
could then use the original BGPN model to verify the concrete trace is a valid failure.
Future works include automated partitioning of a design and optimal composition ordering. For large designs, partitioning a design into appropriately sized components is very
time consuming and non-trivial. Though one component may contain many more wires than
another, the concurrency of the behavior on those wires dominates state space explosion.
When partitioning a design, the user must also consider the degree to which the concurrency
is restricted. Often, two wires may change values concurrently, but their transitions may
be restricted by some complex protocol. It is difficult to identify the degree of state space
explosion without performing state space exploration. Extremely large designs will require
an automated partitioning heuristic.
Many of the problems of partitioning are also the problems of optimal composition
order. When composing state transition graphs, some orderings produce much higher peak
graph sizes than others. The worst possible composition is the state transition graphs of
two components that do not communicate over mutual interface wires. The state size of this
composition is the cross-product of the states in each component. Usually we attempt to
combine components which communicate over some mutual set of interface wires. If these
mutual wires are internal to the component after composition, abstraction removes them
thereby reducing the size of the state transition graph. When composing components, we
must also consider the number of inputs which are driven by a maximal environment. If
an inefficient ordering combines several maximal environments, a state transition graph of
the maximal environments alone may exceed the available resources. Efficient orderings are
essential for verifying large designs. Inspection is a poor approach to ordering and often
leads to trial and error. Automating ordering efficiently will remove a large burden from
the user.
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6.2

Constraints
The most obvious weaknesses in the compositional framework is the creation of false

failures. When performing compositional verification without constraints, false failure traces
cause the FIFO design to have peculiarly small state transition graphs. These false failures
have then been introduced by the maximal environment. By generating constraints we
restrict the behavior supplied by the maximal environment and prevent these false failures
from occurring. The power of this method is demonstrated by the near linear state space
growth of the FIFO example. We also see respectable reductions in the state space size of
the DME example. Constraints actually increase the size of the state transition graph for
the arbiter example. By removing false failures, fewer state transition firings are represented
using the single state transition (π, τ, π) thereby increasing the number of state transitions
in the state transition graph. Although the state space size of the arbiter is increased
by constraints, designs with a large number of arbiter cells benefit from significant runtime reductions when constraints are applied. This is because the constrained environment
reduces the amount of behavior produce by each component thus reducing the time to
abstract each component.
Often, the generated constraints restrict the over-approximated environment such that
it produces less behavior than the maximal environment but more behavior than the actual
environment. This means that we sometimes derive constraints that are not optimal. We
can identify two primary causes for this. The first is simply a characteristic of the design.
When the output of the state transition graph depends on some internal signal, our method
may not be able to identify the a dependency on some input transition in the state transition
graph. Suppose the value of an internal register determines output behavior of a state transition graph. Constraints generation will produce a boolean expression representing this, but
the expression is not useful to other components because the register’s value is not visible on
any interface wires. The over-approximated environment is the second cause for sub-optimal
constraints. When creating a state transition graph, we apply over-approximated environ-
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ment to the component. As previously discussed, the over-approximated environment may
introduce extra behavior into the state transition graph. If this state transition graph is
then used for constraints generation, the extra states may weaken the derived constraints.
Future works should identify starting component least affected by constraints. Another
solutions may include iterative refinement of the constraints. By repeatedly applying constraints and deriving new state transitions graphs, we may be able to find some fixed point
in terms of constraint strength. Given enough dependency in the communication protocols,
we should be able to derive optimal or near-optimal constraints.
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